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Abstract
This paper provides a numerical general equilibrium assessment of policies to reduce tropical
deforestation in Cameroon. Market failure - mainly in the form of national and international
externalities - and policy failures - such as highly distorted product markets - are identified as major
sources of overexploitation. The ecological effects of deforestation control are shown to depend
crucially upon its impact on land use patterns whereas its efficiency effects hinge on the manner in
which a specified set-aside target is achieved. If the international community wants to ensure a higher
level of protection of these forests, and to do so within a market-based system, the provision of
conditional financial resources is necessary.
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There is a consensus among resource economists that the tropical forests are
excessively exploited (e. g. Pearce, 1990; Repetto, 1988). The overutilization results
from two main factors driving a wedge between private and social costs of forest use:
market failure and policy failure. Market failure is a consequence of the fact that
tropical forests do not only supply timber and land for agricultural conversion but also
provide ecological benefits, which because of their public good properties or lacking
property rights do not enter the individual decision making process. Some of these
ecological benefits, such as the stabilization of the water cycle and the protection of
soils against erosion and nutrient losses, affect only populations in the tropical
countries, while others, notably the fixing of carbon and the provision of habitat for a
large share of the world's biological diversity, accrue to the whole world. Hence, local
as well as global externalities have to be considered. Moreover, the pressure on tropical
forests is frequently exacerbated by ecologically harmful government activities
(Repetto, Gillis, 1988). These policy failures range from subsidized regional
development programmes to general biases in the trade regime in favor of resource
intensive production.
Since different factors contribute to the suboptimal forest utilization and since
different economic sectors, particularly agriculture and forestry, use forest resources, a
policy package is required, which should combine the removal of domestic distortions,
national environmental policy measures and international measures. The present paper
quantitatively investigates the effects of such policy measures on the structure,
economic efficiency and the utilization of forest resources of the Cameroonian
economy. The objective is to sort out policy packages, which simultaneously protect
tropical forests and stimulate an efficient resource allocation. For this purpose, a
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model was developed, which - contrary to a
partial equilibrium approach - captures the economy-wide repercussions of sectoral
policies and hence allows for conclusions about structural responses and the change in
land use patterns.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the pattern of
forest use in Cameroon and its economic importance, reviews the underlying policies
and outlines possible improvements in the policy environment. Section 3 explains the
main features of the CGE model employed in the empirical analysis and shortly
discusses the numerical specification of the model. Section 4 presents the results of the
policy simulations for Cameroon. The conclusions of the paper are summarized in
section 5.2. The Cameroonian Case
2.1 Deforestation and its Economic Impact
In the mid-1980s, 16.5 million ha or 40 percent of the land area of Cameroon was
covered by closed tropical forests. At an estimated annual rate of deforestation for
agricultural use of 100,000 ha (Table 1), the resource would be depleted in about 150
years, assuming no behavioural change is taking place. In addition, large parts of the
forest are opened up by the forestry sector.
1 The wood clearance per harvest of 6 m
3/ha
is small compared to the average stand of timber of 280 m
3/ha in virgin forest
(FAO/UNEP, 1981), but on average there are less than six years between two harvests
on the same area. That rotation period is by far too short for the forest to regenerate,
especially as several of the remaining trees are damaged at each harvest.
2
In terms of biomass reduction , the agricultural sector accounts for 90 percent of the
destruction of the Cameroonian rain forest (Table 1). As the soil productivity on
converted areas is very low, the land is mainly cultivated in the form of shifting
cultivation. Since shifting cultivation is nearly exclusively done by small farmers, for
whom the costs of opening up new primary forests are too high, the forestry sector acts
as a pace-maker for agricultural conversion by providing the necessary infrastructure
(Amelung, Diehl, 1992, pp. 19 ff.). Hence, the actual responsibility of the sector for the
problem of deforestation is far greater than its contribution to the reduction of biomass.
Long-run ecological considerations are running contrarily to the economic
significance of tropical forest resources for the agricultural and forestry sector. In the
1980s, forestry and the wood processing industry
3 accounted for about 10 percent of all
export revenues, so that these sectors were a major source of foreign exchange for
Cameroon, following directly after coffee, cocoa and oil (World Bank, 1989). The
importance of the timber industry is still increasing, as the export prospects for coffee,
cocoa and oil are falling because of declining world market prices and decreasing
production. The agricultural production on converted forest land contributed less than 2
percent to total output during the 1980s, but the employment effect is supposed to be
much higher, because mainly small farmers are working on former tropical areas, who
do not have access to modern technology (Amelung, Diehl, 1992, p. 122).
Other economic activities such as the exploitation of minerals and the generation of energy by
hydroelectric power plants are not significantly contributing to deforestation in Cameroon.
The African rain forests have an estimated regeneration period of 20 to 40 years (Grut et al., 1991).
Logging and the sale of unprocessed timber are ascribed to forestry, whereas sawnwood, plywood
and other wood products are ascribed to the wood processing industry.Table 1 - Key characteristics of deforestation in Cameroon 1976 - 1986
Average annual deforestation










y including the total wood clearance for agricultural purpose ("deforestation"). No account is
taken of the degradation of the rain forest, i. e. the selective felling of trees. -.^1981 - 1985; the
degree of biomass reduction takes into account that forestry only damages parts of the forest,
whereas the agricultural sector converts the whole area.
Source: Amelung, Diehl (1992), WRI (1990), FAO (1988).
The importance of the tropical forest as an economic resource has to be weighed
against its ecological functions. A destruction of these functions could negatively
impact on the long-run growth potential of the economy, particularly by reducing
agricultural productivity. In most instances, short-sighted governments tend to ignore
such long-run considerations.
2.2 Hie Policy Environment
Among the wide range of factors that might play a role in determining the rate of
deforestation, we consider exchange rate and trade policy, land tenure and agricultural
pricing policy as well as forestry policy to be of high importance in the Cameroonian
context.
4 These policies will be shortly reviewed in the following.
a) Exchange Rate and Trade Policy
Cameroon's exchange rate policy is externally restricted by its membership in the
franc-zone. The franc-zone is a currency union between France and 13 West and
Central African states, in which the nominal exchange rate has now been fixed at 50
CFA-francs per French franc for more than 40 years.
5 At this parity, the CFA-franc is
fully convertible vis-a-vis the French franc. Until the early 1980s, fairly low inflation
4 An important underlying factor that exerts pressure on the tropical forest is the high population
growth rate in Cameroon. Strategies to reduce the population pressure - which should, among other
things, include measures to alleviate poverty - and their impact on deforestation will not be analyzed
in this paper.
5 For critical assessments of the franc-zone, see, for example, Boughton (1991) or Schweickert ct al.
(1992).rates in the CFA-zone guaranteed that the real exchange rate remained at a competitive
level. But devaluations of the currencies of neighboring competitors like Ghana and
Nigeria and the strength of the French franc vis-a-vis the US dollar since 1985 led to
significant appreciations of the real effective exchange rates in some member states of
the CFA-zone, particularly in Cameroon and Cote d'lvoire, who have relatively
substantial trade with the United States (Boughton, 1991). Milner (1990) estimates that
Cameroon had a currency overvaluation of 12 percent in 1986.
6
Like many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Cameroon pursued an import-
substitution strategy since Independence. The consumer goods and food processing
industries are highly protected against import competition, whereas there are lower
import restrictions for intermediate and capital goods as well as for most primary
products (Devarajan, Rodrik, 1991). The measures taken include tariffs as well as
quantitative restrictions like the requirement for import licences. Moreover, Cameroon's
exports are subject to export duties, which are highest for traditional exports, while the
majority of manufactured exports is exempted (Milner, 1990). Altogether, the
Cameroonian trade policy has always created a substantial anti-export bias, which has
been reinforced by the currency overvaluation in the 1980s.
b) Agricultural Policy
Cameroon's economy is still fundamentally based on agriculture (World Bank,
1989). The sector accounts for about 20 percent of GDP and provides employment for
nearly three-quarters of the population. Apart from the transitory oil boom in the early
1980s, cocoa and coffee have always been the main sources of foreign exchange
earnings for the country. 93 percent of Cameroon's agricultural output is produced by
smallholders, and consists of various food crops, coffee, cocoa and cotton. The
remaining 7 percent is comprised of rubber, palm oil, sugar, tobacco and bananas from
mostly state-owned industrial plantations.
The Cameroonian agricultural sector was highly regulated until the end of the 1980s
(World Bank, 1989).
7 For all major crops, the government set producer prices,
regulated marketing, and set profit and distribution margins. The pricing policy towards
food crops was dominated by the striving for self-sufficiency. Domestic producers were
protected against foreign competitors by a combination of guaranteed prices, import
duties and import quotas. In the export crops sector, the system of fixing prices
independently of world market trends imposed heavy taxation on farmers, until world
market prices for cocoa and coffee sharply declined after 1985. In 1983, for example,
This estimate was based on survey information about the black market exchange rate; the
differential between black market and official rate was halved to account for the risk premium
involved in unofficial transactions.
In 1989, the government of Cameroon and the World Bank agreed on a structural adjustment
programme which, among other tilings, included a deregulation in the agricultural sector.producer prices for cocoa and coffee were 67 and 65 percent below their world market
equivalents (Lele, 1990).
In addition to price incentives, non-price factors play a crucial role for the
profitability of agricultural production (Krishna, 1982; Beynon, 1989). Among these the
security of land tenure is of high importance, because it determines in how far farmers -
especially smallholders - have access to credits which would enable them to buy
fertilizer and other inputs.
8 In Cameroon only about 2 percent of the owned land is held
by title and thus can be used as a collateral (IRG, 1992). As a consequence, investment
in productivity enhancing measures remains low. This is particularly a problem for
farmers on converted tropical forest land, who because of the poor soil quality are
forced to shift into new areas very frequently. Moreover, the insecurity of tenure
provides a strong incentive for scattered plantation of tree crops to claim ownership of
land.
c) Forest Policy
Virtually all the forests of Cameroon are publicly owned, whereas logging is nearly
exclusively carried out by the private sector, predominantly by foreign firms (Djophant,
Tschounkoue, 1992). Concession licences can be obtained for 5 years only, and under
cumbersome and lengthy procedures (World Bank, 1989). Concessionaires face a very
complex taxation system containing numerous area taxes, stumpage fees and export
taxes, but the total of all forest revenues from all forest fees falls by far short of
capturing the resource rent accruing to the concessionaires.
9 For 1973/74, Repetto
(1988, p. 18) reports rents between 7 and 61 US dollar per m
3, depending on the value
of the species and the costs of transporting the logs to the market. In expectation of high
excess profits, domestic and foreign firms are induced to invest in rent-seeking
activities and to acquire concessions over vast forest areas (Repetto, 1988). This does
not only mean that resources are wasted for unproductive activities, but also that
deforestation by shifting cultivators is encouraged, because the forestry industry has
little incentive to control encroachment if it has excess area.
Low forest fees also act as an implicit subsidy for the wood processing industry by
providing cheap log inputs. This leads to a waste of wood and discourages investment
in human capital and new equipment, because sawmills and plywood mills have an
incentive to substitute cheap logs for other inputs, labor and capital (Grut et al., 1991).
More directly, domestic processing is promoted by a requirement to process at least 60
percent of the log volume from concessions locally. This regulation can distort domestic
Q
0 Other non-price factors, such as the provision of infrastructure and research and extension which
predominantly fall into the domain of the government, are not analyzed in this paper.
9 The resource rent, or stumpage value, of a standing tree is the difference between the market value
of the timber and all the logging, transportation, and processing costs.production (Grut et al., 1991). Usually the more valuable logs are exported, while the
less valuable species are the ones that end up being processed domestically. As a result
of this distortion, domestic processing becomes less efficient. Currently, the
Cameroonian government is even considering an outright log export ban.
With respect to the conservation of forest ecosystems, the Cameroonian government
has announced the ambitious target to set aside 20 percent of the national territory in
national parks and wildlife reserves (IRG, 1992).
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0 At present, only 5 percent of the
total national area falls under protective schemes and most of the parks and reserves are
not sufficiently protected against encroachment. Only the parks and reserves receiving
additional outside assistance, such as the Korup National Park, fair better.
2.3 Proposed Policy Changes
Any policy package for a better management of tropical forests should contain
measures to correct for market failure at the local and global level as well as measures
to correct for ecologically harmful government activities. Moreover, we argue that even
such distortions which might be regarded as environmentally friendly - e.g. the taxation
of agricultural exports - should be removed in order to achieve efficiency gains and to
approximate a first-best starting point for the application of environmental policy
measures.
The local externalities of deforestation can be split up into a "user cost" and an
"environmental externality" component (Barbier et al., 1992). User costs denote the
foregone future returns of using a resource today. The creation of adequate property
rights ensures that the producers internalize these user costs. The external
environmental costs of forest exploitation, such as watershed degradation and soil
erosion, can be internalized by means of price and quantity policies.
The definition and enforcement of property or user rights is the basic precondition
for individuals to include sustainability considerations into their decisions. Missing or
ill-defined property rights encourage short-run profit maximization and thus lead to the
overexploitation of resources. In order to avoid this, the contractual arrangements for
timber concessionaires have to be improved. One possibility is to base the duration of
logging concessions for the Cameroonian forests, the majority of which is state-owned,
on the regeneration period of about 30 years, whereas the licenses are currently given
for 5 years at maximum (World Bank, 1989). Other arrangements, such as conditioning
the continuation of short-term contracts on "sustainable" harvesting practices or even
the outright sale of the land, could also be applied (Barbier et al., 1992). Moreover, the
licences should be tradable to provide an incentive for the concessionaires to maintain
the value of their timber stands (Repetto, 1988). For the agricultural sector, it is
10 This target includes the evergreen forest area as well as the savanna zone in the north.important that land titles on converted forest areas are secure and transferable and that
the land can be used as a collateral in borrowing for improvements.
Once having reached the long-run privately efficient use of forest resources by the
provision of property rights, the remaining external environmental costs can be
internalized by imposing a tax. The first-best solution is a tax on the use of tropical
forest land, because it is levied - as suggested by the theory of domestic distortions
(Corden, 1974) - exactly at the point where the externality occurs. Since logging is
ecologically less harmful then agricultural conversion and since the cultivation of tree
crops like coffee and cocoa causes less damage than the cultivation of food crops like
rice and cassava (Repetto, 1989), there is a rationale for varying tax rates.
Another possibility to narrow the gap between private and social costs of
deforestation is to fix upper limits for the use of forest resources. The government could
prescribe concessionaires not to cut trees until they have reached a certain age. The
objective of such a selective logging regime is to account for the renewability of the
tropical rain forest, thereby making a sustainable forest management possible.
1
1 A
further option for the government is to directly set aside areas, e.g. by establishing new
national parks. National parks should be located on areas with rich biodiversity and low
quality soils, which are not suitable for economic use. In order to achieve this
allocation, the government has to carry out a detailed land use planning.
Theoretically, the local external environmental costs of deforestation should be
internalized by employing a tax or a quantity measure in order to achieve an economic
optimum. However, since the ecological costs of deforestation can only be estimated
with high uncertainty and since damages may be irreversible, a safe minimum standard
may, in practice, be a more adequate reference point for policy measures (Pearce,
Turner, 1990, pp. 317 ff.).
If all external costs of deforestation are accounted for, the timber concessionaire is
still making an economic rent. The government can capture all or part of this rent
through fees and taxes. The auctioning of licences is a means of capturing virtually all
the rent, provided that the government ensures competition (Grut et al., 1991).
Competitive bidding has two further advantages compared to the present discretionary
allocation of licences. First, it avoids the lengthy administrative process of choosing
among competing applicants. Second, it allocates concessions to those applicants to
whom they are most valuable. Moreover, the Cameroonian government should remove
1
1 Foresters point out that it is possible to manage tropical forests sustainably, but that current
management practices for the most part are unsustainable (Bruenig, 1990).the domestic processing requirement for logs or at least replace it by an export tax,
which is more efficient and additionally generates revenues (Repetto, 1988).
1
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With respect to foreign trade, Cameroon should move towards a more neutral
incentive structure between exported and import-competing as well as between tradable
and non-tradable goods. The former can be achieved by means of a trade liberalization,
whereas the latter requires a real devaluation of the CFA Franc in order to correct for
the present overvaluation of the currency which works in favor of the non-tradables
sector.
For the internalization of the global external costs of deforestation, i.e. climate
change and the loss of biodiversity, two broad categories of instruments are available:
import restrictions for tropical hardwood and international compensation payments for
the conservation of tropical forests (see, for instance, Barbier et al., 1992).
Compensation payments build on the cooperation between industrial and tropical
countries, as they rely on complementary national resource policy measures. Contrary
to development aid, they should not be interpreted as a grant but as a payment for an
environmental service (Amelung, Diehl, 1992). The theoretical reference point for the
amount of money spent is the gap between the economic losses for the developing
country caused by the implementation of a resource policy and the ecological benefits
accruing to the developing country through the conservation of its forests (Amelung,
1991). The actual payments will, however, crucially depend on the bargaining power of
the parties involved in the treaty, because both the local and global ecological benefits
of conservation can only be calculated with high uncertainty. Furthermore, it has to be
decided how the transfers should be used. In order to be effective in compensating the
net losers of environmental protection, the transfer must contain some kind of
conditionality, e.g. the prescription that the funds have to be invested in the creation of
new employment opportunities outside the tropical forest.
1
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Import restrictions for tropical hardwood have the advantage that they can be applied
directly without any prior bargaining. However, their ecological effectiveness is not
guaranteed. A necessary condition for import restrictions to be effective is that the
tropical country - as Cameroon does - exports a large share of the forestry output. This
has to be weighed against the fact that in Cameroon the forestry sector is only a minor
user of tropical forest resources compared to agriculture. It cannot be excluded that as a
Policies designed to stimulate domestic log processing are usually justified by the tariffs and trade
barriers against processed forest products of developing countries or by the infant industry argument.
The former justification is, however, not valid for Cameroon, because it delivers nearly all its wood
products to the EC, where it receives unlimited duty-free access under the Lom6 Convention (Grut
et al., 1991). What remains is the infant industry argument, the rationale of which is doubted by
many economists (e.g. Baldwin, 1969).
Nunnenkamp (1992) discusses various institutional arrangements for compensation payments with
respect to their stability and ecological effectiveness.result of lower forestry activity the conversion of land for agricultural use will increase
to such an extent that the outcome for the tropical forest will be worse than without any
policy intervention. Import restrictions have at least three additional disadvantages.
First, they have adverse distributional consequences by shifting nearly all the costs of
adjustment to the tropical countries. Second, they make any complementary protective
measures in the tropical countries unlikely. Finally, import restrictions are inferior to
national resource policies from a welfare theoretic point of view, because they imply
additional deadweight losses by distorting consumption (Braga, 1992).
In the following, the aforementioned policy measures will be empirically analyzed
with respect to their consequences for the economy and the use of tropical forest
resources. But first, the main characteristics of the model have to be described.
3. The Model
3.1 Theoretical Structure
The model we use in the empirical analysis is a standard CGE model as described in
Dervis et al. (1982), extended by a forestry submodel along the lines of Dee (1991b).
1
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A major advantage of the multisectoral approach is that it captures the implications of
environmental and economic policy instruments for land use patterns. This is important,
because the question of whether forests should be logged, or left as protected areas, or
cleared entirely for agricultural use, is primarily a question of land use patterns. The
forestry submodel enables us to examine the conventional forestry policy measures like
resource taxes, secure property rights, selective logging regimes, and the setting up of
national parks.
The treatment of the forestry sector is closely related to the forest economics
literature. The traditional economic problem is to find the rotation period
1^ that
maximizes the present value of net returns from the current and all future harvests, at
given timber prices, harvesting costs, interest rates, and physical growth characteristics
of trees (Bowes, Krutilla, 1985). While the traditional model does not take into account
the environmental services provided by the forest, we do so by constraining harvests via
the introduction of a minimum harvest age T* (Nguyen, 1979). By means of such a
selective logging regime the government can ensure that a certain minimum timber
stock remains after each harvest. In the modified model, foresters choose the optimal





A detailed formal description of the model can be found in Thiele, Wiebelt (1993).
The rotation period is the length of time between two harvests on a specific area (here on one ha).10
where PV is the present value of net returns per hectare, RR is the net return per hectare
per rotation, T-T* is the rotation period, and r is the discount rate applied by the
concessionaire. The first-order condition of the maximization problem is given by
with RR = (px • HV-RC)\\-tF) (2a)
and RR' = dRR/dT = Px -dHV/dT-(l-tF), (2b)
where HV denotes the volume of timber harvested per hectare per rotation, Px the
output price of timber, RC the harvest costs per hectare per rotation, and tF a factor tax
on forest land.
The interpretation of the first-order condition is that foresters should harvest at the
age T or, equivalently, choose the rotation period T-T*, at which the marginal increase
in net revenues from further growth of the forest (RR') just equals the opportunity cost
of delaying the harvest. The opportunity cost is the potential interest income foregone




accounts for the fact that not only the current harvest but also future harvests are
postponed, if the rotation period is extended.
1
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Equation (2) reveals that an increase in the discount rate, which may be attributed to
more insecure property rights for concessionaires, raises the opportunity costs of letting
trees grow and hence leads to a shorter rotation period. A rise in the timber output price
raises both the marginal revenues from further growth and the opportunity costs. Using
the definitions (2a) and (2b), one can see that , with positive harvesting costs, the
increase in RR is stronger than that in RR' so that the rotation period shortens. Finally,
higher harvesting costs reduce opportunity costs, leading to an extension of the rotation
period.
The physical growth of trees is described by a logistic functional form (Figure I).
1
7
Initially, trees grow very rapidly. Slower growth sets in as the stand matures, until
growth stops when the climax state (MV) is reached. At any chosen rotation period, the












The assumption of a logistic growth curve is common in the literature on renewable resources (e.g.
Wilen, 1985; Clark, 1990).11








harvested per hectare per rotation. This can be discerned from Figure 1. Assume that the
initial rotation period was To -T*. This corresponds to a harvest size of TVO -SV,
where TV denotes the volume of timber per hectare before the harvest, and SV the
minimum volume of timber that has to be left as a result of the minimum harvest age
T*. Now assume that the forestry sector is forced to shorten the rotation period to
7] - T*. As a consequence, the harvested volume per rotation is reduced to TVX -SV.
Logging technology is described by a Leontief function which combines land and a
non-land input bundle consisting of capital, labor and intermediate inputs at the top of a
multi-level production function. It is assumed that the bundle of non-land inputs is fixed
per rotation, which gives rise to a form of increasing returns to scale (Dee, 1991b).
Within the input bundle, substitution possibilities between labor and capital and
between imported and domestically produced intermediates are allowed.
Since the harvest volume HV above is defined per hectare per rotation, it has to be
translated into annual output for the entire forest in order to make the forestry submodel
compatible with the rest of the model. Assuming that the harvest per rotation is equally
distributed over the years of the rotation period, annual timber output X from the whole
harvested area B is
X = HV-BI{T-T*). (3)
The rest of the model follows conventional lines. Domestic supply of all sectors
except forestry is given by a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production function, using
labor of different occupations, forest and non-forest land (in agriculture), and sector-
specific capital, which is fixed in the short run. A Leontief function combines the
aggregate of primary factors and intermediate inputs. The producers in each sector
choose their demand for labor (and land in agriculture) and their output so as to
maximize profits at the given wage rates, factor taxes, land prices, commodity prices
and capital stocks.
Regarding foreign trade, Cameroon is assumed to be a small country not able to
influence world market prices. While this is in accordance with classical trade theory,
we deviate from its assumptions in some other respects. First, domestically produced
goods and imports of the same product category are regarded as imperfect substitutes.
The substitution possibilities for domestic consumers are described by a CES (Constant
Elasticity of Substitution) function (Armington, 1969). In a similar way, differences in
quality between domestically consumed and exported commodities are described by a
CET (Constant Elasticity of Transformation) function (Powell, Gruen, 1968). Finally,
we specify Cameroon's exports of some sectors as facing a constant elasticity demand
function. This formulation takes account of the fact that as the domestic price of aSibliothek
des Instituts fur Weltwirtschafi
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commodity rises (falls) relative to the world market price, export demand may fall (rise)
although the country is still a price-taker.
In the household sector, we assume there is only one representative consumer who
buys consumer goods according to fixed expenditure shares. This demand system can
be derived from the maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Government
demand for final goods is defined using fixed shares of aggregate real spending on
goods and services. The sectoral allocation of investable funds is determined by
exogenously given share parameters. These share parameters are fixed within one
period, but are allowed to adjust over time (see below). Inventories are a fixed
proportion of sectoral supply.
In order to solve the CGE model, market clearing equations for the product and
factor markets as well as macroeconomic equilibrium conditions for the balance of
payments and the savings-investment balance must be specified. Supply and demand in
product markets is equilibrated by the adjustment of sectoral prices. For the factor
markets we assume that the supply of each factor is exogenously fixed.
1
8 Market
clearing requires that total factor demand equals supply, and the equilibrating variables
are the average factor prices. While sectoral capital stocks are assumed to be fix within
each period, all labor categories are intersectorally mobile, agricultural land is mobile
across all agricultural activities and forest land across all forest land using activities.
Forest land moves towards the use in which the discounted returns to land are greater.
Returns to forest land therefore adjust until their discounted values are equalized across
sectors. With foreign savings set exogenously, equilibrium in the balance of payments is
achieved via adjustments in the real exchange rate. As the nominal exchange rate is
fixed in Cameroon, changes in the real exchange rate are the result of movements in the
absolute price level. Finally, aggregate investment is the endogenous sum of private,
government and foreign savings, i.e. the model is "savings-driven". This is the so-called
"neoclassical" model closure (see, for instance, Robinson, 1989).
Despite the intertemporal treatment of forestry the model can be solved within a
comparative static framework. Our model is nevertheless dynamic
1
9 as it contains
equations governing the growth of primary factors over time. While the total supply of
labor and land is adjusted exogenously, sectoral capital stocks are built up according to
a simple investment model. In this investment model, the sectoral allocation of
investable funds is adjusted as a function of the relative profit rate of each sector
With respect to forest land, the assumption of a fixed aggregate supply seems appropriate for
Cameroon, where the access of the forestry sector is restricted by the provision of concessions and
where agricultural use is dominated by smallholders who are not able to open up new primary
forests.
Our dynamic specification assumes that agents are myopic, basing their decisions on static
expectations about prices and quantities. As a consequence, the model can be solved recursively for
a sequence of equilibria.14
compared to the average profit rate in the economy. Sectors with higher-than-average
profit rates will get a larger share of investable funds than their share in aggregate
profits. An important advantage of such a dynamic formulation is that it allows to
investigate the growth effects of different allocations of international transfer payments.
To take an extreme example: if the money is exclusively spent for consumption
purposes, this will cause mainly Dutch Disease effects, if it is invested this will enhance
the production capacity and thus lay the ground for the creation of new employment
opportunities.
3.2 Numerical Specification
The theoretical model was calibrated to a consistent data set for the year 1980, which
is assumed to represent a benchmark equilibrium of the Cameroonian economy. Data
from different statistical sources had to be adjusted and a number of parameters, such as
those of the above mentioned CES and CET functions, had to be fixed (Mansur,
Whalley, 1984).
2
0 The underlying data base is given in Thiele, Wiebelt (1993). Table 2
provides a summary of the most important structural features of the Cameroonian
economy. We distinguish 11 sectors of production, 5 of which are directly - food crops,
cash crops and forestry - or indirectly via strong backward linkages to the primary
sectors - wood processing and consumer goods which includes food processing -
involved in forest exploitation. Column (1) describes the structure of production across
sectors. It reveals a typical composition of output in developing countries where
agriculture and services provide more than 60 percent of GDP. The importance of
intermediate inputs in each sector is indicated by the per unit value added in column (2).
High value added ratios, e.g. for food crops and forestry, indicate small backward
linkages. By contrast, the manufacturing sectors exhibit generally the lowest value
added ratios suggesting high backward linkages.
The next three columns provide information about each sector's trade orientation.
Column (3) indicates that cash crops and forestry are the most export-oriented sectors in
the economy. On the import side, the typical pictures emerges when one considers both
the share of imports in domestic absorption (which indicates the degree of import
"orientation") and the share of imported inputs in total intermediate inputs (which
indicates the degree of import "dependence"). The manufacturing sectors are the most
import-oriented sectors and all sectors are highly import-dependent.
2
1 Construction and
In addition, some physical characteristics of the tropical forest - e.g. the average timber stock in the
primary forest (MY) - must be provided in order to make the model operational (Dee, 1991a).
The high import share for cash crops should not be interpreted as indicating import orientation. It is










































































































































Source: Thiele, Wiebelt (1993), Condon et al. (1987).16
public services are the only non-traded sectors, yet 45 and 19 percent of their inputs are
imported. The import substitution and export transformation elasticities in columns (6)
and (7) indicate that the extent of product differentiation due to differences in quality
and the degree of product heterogeneity is higher for non-traditional manufactures and
services than for agricultural products and the more traditional consumer goods.
Finally, the export demand elasticities in column (8) reflect the ease with which foreign
users can substitute domestic products. Here, agricultural commodities are less
substitutable than other goods.
Once having constructed a consistent data set, one can compute the equilibrium
prices for each period (or the actually traded quantities, if prices are exogenously
given), which in turn determine the allocation of resources and the use of tropical
forests. The effects of different policy measures are analyzed by running model
simulations. This means that exogenous variables are changed and a new sequence of
equilibria is computed. Policy appraisal then proceeds on the basis of pairwise
comparison of counterfactual and benchmark equilibria. Despite of the incorporation of
dynamics the solutions generated by the model should be interpreted as medium term
results. To capture the long-run implications of measures to cope with deforestation, an
extension of the model is required. For example, one has to keep track of the negative
stock effects that deforestation has on agricultural productivity (Devarajan, 1990).
4. Empirical Results
This section presents the simulation results for the policy measures discussed in
Section 2.3 and shows how single measures can be combined to obtain consistent policy
packages.
4.1 Resource Policies
We assume that the target of the Cameroonian government is to achieve a specified
increase in the volume of standing timber. For concreteness, the target for each policy
measure is set at 5 million m
3, equivalent to about 20 percent of the biomass losses
caused by one year's deforestation and degradation. Altogether, we distinguish four
different resource policy instruments.
The first is an increase in the length of forest leases so that concessionaires have an
incentive to take account of the user costs of short-run harvesting and hence to harvest
the stand at the private long-run efficient level. This has been modeled as a reduction of
the discount rate, which concessionaires apply to calculate their returns from forestry,
by 30 percent. A lower discount rate simply implies that future revenues get a higher
weight as a result of more secure property rights.17
The objective of the remaining three instruments is to deal with the environmental
externalities of deforestation and forest degradation. The first option we consider is an
increase in the stipulated minimum harvest age of trees by 8 years in order to make
forestry more sustainable. The second option is a direct set-aside in the form of a
national park. The increase in national parks has been modeled as a reduction in the
total area of forest land available for forestry and agriculture by 220,000 ha. The final
option is a tax on income from forest land to put a value on the unpriced ecological
benefits that harvesting and conversion destroys.
2
2 This might be called the Pigouvian
solution. As the ecological damage varies according to land use patterns, the tax rates
are varied accordingly, i.e. 10 percent for forestry, 20 percent for export crops and 25
percent for food crops.
Table 3 shows the impact of each resource policy on real GDP, aggregate exports,
and the domestic price level as well as on sectoral production, exports and producer
prices. It is striking that all policies induce a considerable reduction of forestry's
production and exports, leading to increasing domestic producer prices.
2
3 Wood
processing is heavily penalized by increasing input costs because of its strong backward
linkages to the forestry sector.
The change in the annual forestry activity level is determined by three variables (see
Equation 3):
- the rotation period;
- the volume of timber harvested per hectare per rotation; and
- the area of land devoted to forestry.
The forestry sector adjusts these variables in different ways depending on the specific
policy measure (Table 4).
When the discount rate is lowered (simulation 1), this reduces the opportunity cost of
letting trees grow so that there is an incentive for concessionaires to extend the rotation
period. Since the subsequent increase in the harvested volume per rotation does not
fully compensate for the more infrequent harvests, the net result is a reduction in annual
output and a rise in the timber price. As gross harvest revenues increase, because the
rise in the timber price is stronger than the decline in harvests, and annual harvesting
costs decrease, because the rotation period is extended, forestry net revenues and the
stock value of land increase. This provides the price signal to attract additional land into
2
2 A tax on income from forest land is also a means of capturing a sizeable proportion of the resource
rent accruing to foresters (Gray, 1983). Because of the similarity of the results we will not report
separate simulations for rent capture.
2^ The fact that the contraction in domestic supply forces up domestic timber prices, although log
imports are available, is a result of the Armington assumption of imperfect substitution between
domestic and imported commodities.18
forestry and thereby eases off the initial output reduction.
2
4 The reallocation of forest
land contributes significantly to the achievement of the ecological target as it implies
that the planned conversion of some forest areas does not take place. Furthermore, it has
only minor effects on agricultural output and prices because forest land is only a small
fraction of total agricultural land.








































































































about 5 million m
3
Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.
The 4.4 percent decline in annual output is the net result of a 10.3 percent increase in the lengtli of
the rotation period and two offsetting factors, namely a 4.7 percent increase in the harvest volume
per rotation and a 1.2 percent increase in the land devoted to forestry: -10.3 + 4.7 + 1.2 = -4.4
(Tables 3 and 4).19
The primary impact of an increase in the minimum harvest age (simulation 2) is that
foresters have to wait for trees to grow larger before they harvest them, i.e. the rotation
period is shortened exogenously. This change in the logging regime reduces the
opportunity costs of forest growth by making earlier future harvests possible. As a
consequence, concessionaires increase the age at which they actually harvest the trees.
On balance, the rotation period is extended. The change in the volume of timber
harvested per rotation is the result of two offsetting factors. First, at any given
minimum harvest age, the increase in the actual harvest age leads to a higher harvest
volume (see Figure 1). Second, the increase in the minimum harvest age reduces the
harvestable timber volume by stipulating a higher amount of timber (SV) that has to be
left after each harvest . In Cameroon, the second effect dominates the first and hence
the harvest per hectare per rotation falls. An explanation for this result provides the
Cameroonian peculiarity that, because of very small and selective harvests, the timber
volume in logged forests (TV) is very close to the maximum timber volume in virgin
forests (MV).
2
5 This implies an extremely low growth rate of trees so that delaying
harvest does not yield much additional timber. Both, the lower and less frequent
harvests are translated into a decline in annual output and a rise of the timber price. The
negative output effect is partly offset by an increase in the area of land devoted to
forestry via the same mechanism as described for simulation 1.
Table 4 - Consequences of Resource Policies for the Use of Forest Land (percentage change)
Policies
Indicators














































Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.
The average timber volume in logged forest is 266 m
3/ha as compared to 280 m
3/ha in virgin forests.20
The establishment of a national park (simulation 3) initially reduces the area
available for forestry activities. As a consequence, annual output declines, pushing up
the price of domestically produced timber. The higher output price provides an
incentive for concessionaires to undertake more frequent harvests, because it raises the
opportunity costs by more than the marginal revenues of forest growth (see Section 3).
The shorter rotation period, in turn, leads to smaller harvests per rotation. On balance,
annual production falls and the output price increases. With gross revenues increasing
more than annual harvesting cost, a rising stock value of forest land attracts land from
agriculture thereby cushioning the output reduction in forestry.
A general taxation of forest land (simulation 4) forces up the price of forest land in
forestry as well as in agriculture and thus leads to a reduced demand for this factor in
both sectors.
2
6 As the frequency and the intensity of harvests adjust only marginally
and compensate each other, the decline in annual output of the forestry sector is solely
due to the reduction of forest land use.
The output losses in forestry and wood processing lead to moderate reductions of
real GDP in the range of 0.2 to 0.4 percent, depending on the policy choice. Because of
the weak linkages to other sectors there are only minor real adjustments in the rest of
the economy. On the demand side, exports have to carry the major burden of
adjustment. This is because forestry and wood processing are highly export oriented and
because the export demand for forest products is very elastic. The sharp decline in
exports of the timber industry would impose a significant constraint on the
Cameroonian economy, especially in a situation in which export prospects for coffee,
cocoa and oil are discouraging and the country has to look for alternative foreign
exchange sources. Moreover, the wood industry is a relatively labor-intensive industry
in which Cameroon may have a comparative advantage (World Bank, 1989).
Basically, the ecological target can be realized by each of the resource policies
analyzed above. Considering the fact that the main problem in Cameroon is the short
rotation period and the damage caused by frequent harvests, the best solution from an
ecological point of view is to extend logging concessions. This would encourage
concessionaires to take into account the regenerative capacity of the forests. Moreover,
this me'asure has the lowest side effects on production and exports in the timber
industry.
In order to simulate the impact of sectorally differentiated land taxes on total land use we assumed a
perfectly elastic supply of forest land. The results are, therefore, not fully compatible with those of
the other simulations.21
4.2 Trade Policies
In section 2, we identified the agricultural pricing policy and the trade regime in
general as main obstacles for greater efficiency in the Cameroonian economy. A trade
liberalization to improve the competitive edge of the country may increase the use of
tropical forest resources compared with the status quo, if it leads to a reallocation of
resources to the agricultural sector. Consequently, it has to be analyzed whether there is
a trade-off between efficiency and ecological objectives. We do this by examining two
different policy measures: first, an elimination of import tariffs and export taxes on
agricultural goods, and second, a general abolition of import tariffs.
Table 5 shows the impact of these policies on some important macroeconomic
aggregates and the use of forest resources. Generally, trade liberalization will increase
real GDP with the extent depending on the structure of the economy, the structure of
protection, and the extent of liberalization. If the liberalization is restricted to
agricultural markets (simulation 5), the efficiency gains are very small, while they
amount to more than one percent, if import tariffs are eliminated across-the-board
(simulation 6). As indicated by higher import and export flows, liberalization induces a
shift of resources towards tradables.

































































Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.22
In order to analyze the effects that liberalization has on the use of tropical forests, one
has to look at its impact on the sectoral allocation of resources (Table 6). The
elimination of import tariffs on food crops and cash crops induces domestic users to
shift part of their demand towards imports as the domestic price increases relative to the
import price. However, the decline in demand for domestically produced agricultural
goods is small, because imports rise from a very low base. Because of better
substitution possibilities the increase in imports is somewhat higher for food crops than
for cash crops. As decreasing domestic demand lowers the domestic price, there is a
secondary repercussion on the demand for exports. Exports will increase, the extent
depending on the transformation elasticity and the export demand elasticity. The
removal of export taxes for cash crops greatly improves their competitiveness in world
markets and pushes up export sales, although the expansion is limited by the relatively
inelastic export demand.

































































































Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.
These are the direct effects determining the initial response in the deregulated
markets. In order to estimate the final resource shift in the economy, we must also take
into account the economy-wide effects. In the present case, the main economy-wide23
repercussions result from the fact that taxes on agricultural exports make a significant
contribution to the government budget and that their elimination reduces government
expenditures substantially. Since the demand for public services predominantly stems
from the government, this sector contracts and releases labor to other sectors, especially
to manufacturing. Other channels for economy-wide effects are less important. Real
wages do not change dramatically. The real exchange rate remains almost constant (see
Table 5), because the pressure to devalue exerted by the elimination of tariffs and the
resulting deterioration of the trade balance is neutralized by the improvement of the
trade balance following the removal of export taxes. Intermediate input costs do not
play a dominant role because of agriculture's weak linkages to the rest of the economy.
There are two exceptions: first, via food processing there is a strong forward linkage to
consumer goods of food crops, and second, there is a backward linkage to intermediate
goods of cash crops via the purchase of fertilizer. Lower domestic prices for
domestically produced and imported food crops as a result of zero tariffs lower the
production costs of consumer goods whereas higher domestic prices for cash crops as a
result of tariff and export-tax abolition stimulate fertilizer demand and production.
Altogether, the change in the use of tropical forests is dominated by the direct
effects, which lead to a moderate contraction of food crops and a substantial expansion
of cash crops. This implies a reallocation of forest land from forestry and food crops to
cash crops (see Table 5). As a consequence, the volume of standing timber declines
compared to the reference situation, because additional forest areas are converted for
agricultural use. The forestry sector faces only minor adjustment needs. With harvesting
cost and revenues being roughly unchanged, foresters have no incentive to alter the
rotation length and, hence, the harvested volume also remains at its initial level. The
small output reduction in forestry is the result of the reallocation of forest land.
If import tariffs are eliminated across-the-board, domestic users substitute imports
for domestically produced goods in all tradable sectors except private services, which
does not receive any import protection in the reference situation. The agricultural
sectors and consumer goods show the highest growth rates of imports because of
relatively good substitution possibilities and - in the case of consumer goods - a high
initial protection level. For the manufacturing sectors with high import shares,
increasing imports correspond to substantial decreases in domestic demand, so that they
are most heavily penalized by the direct effects of the trade liberalization.
This picture changes, however, when the economy-wide repercussions are taken into
account. First, abolishing tariffs reduces intermediate input cost throughout the
economy. This stimulates production in those sectors having strong backward linkages
and a high share of imported in total intermediate use, i.e. predominantly in24
manufacturing. Second, the real exchange rate has to depreciate by 16.7 percent,
2
7
thereby inducing a reallocation of resources towards traded goods. The real depreciation
favors cash crops and the manufacturing sectors while it hurts the nontradable sectors
and food crops, which can almost be treated as an additional nontradable sector.
Forestry does not fit into this pattern. While being highly trade oriented, the sector
cannot expand significantly in the presence of a more competitive exchange rate,
because it exhibits a very low supply elasticity
2
8 so that increasing demand only leads
to a large increase in the domestic price. Finally, the removal of trade restrictions
lowers domestic real wages, which again works in favor of sectors producing export
goods and import substitutes and hence being exposed to international price
competition. A further repercussion is due to the government's loss of tariff revenues.
While we assume that the government raises household taxes in order to maintain a
certain supply of public goods, there is a moderate reduction in real government
expenditures. As a consequence, resources are shifted from the public to the private
sector.
On balance, cash crops and the manufacturing sectors are the winners of trade
liberalization. The predominant factor explaining the expansion of cash crops is the
devaluation of the CFA Franc. The manufacturing sector benefits from the elimination
of import tariffs, because the costs for intermediate inputs decline sharply whereas the
output prices for domestic goods are not decreasing to the same extent as the prices of
imports because of limited substitution possibilities in domestic demand. The final
resource shift corresponds to an increase in the volume of standing timber which is
mainly, due to two reasons: First, the removal of import tariffs provides an incentive for
the manufacturing sector to absorb additional resources. Second, the steep increase in
the timber price attracts land to the forestry sector, i.e. agricultural conversion is
reduced. A further effect of the price increase is that foresters shorten the rotation
period (see section 3), whereupon the harvested timber volume per rotation decreases.
Summing up, a general trade liberalization not only raises real GDP but also eases
pressure on the tropical forests. Hence, it overcomes the trade-off between efficiency
and ecological objectives. It has, however, one negative ecological side-effect by
further shortening the rotation period which is already extremely short in Cameroon. A
preferable option would be to combine a general trade liberalization with long-term
logging concessions as is illustrated in Table 5 (simulation 7). Such a policy mix would
on the one hand encourage a sustainable use of tropical forests and, on the other hand,
This devaluation is sufficient to correct for the overvaluation of the CFA Franc (see Section 2).
The low supply elasticity in forestry follows from the Leontief technology which combines land and
non-land inputs in fixed proportions. The bottleneck for the supply response is the availability of
land, because the forestry sector can only attract additional land as long as the discounted returns are
higher than in agriculture.25
promote exports and economic growth, thereby improving the long-run development
potential of Cameroon without any outside support.
4.3 International Measures
This section deals with two basic options which industrialized countries have to
affect the level of tropical forest exploitation (see subsection 2.3). First, we consider an
import ban of Cameroon's logs and processed timber, the most restrictive among the
foreign policy measures which may be applied. Second, international transfer payments
are investigated. The results of the simulations are presented in Table 7.
Table 7 - Consequences of International Measures for the Economy and the Use of Forest Resources
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Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.
As it seems unrealistic that an import ban works perfectly, we assume in simulation 8
that Cameroon is, after the introduction of the ban, still able to sell 10 percent of its
previous tropical hardwood exports to outsiders who do not obey the ban. Nevertheless,
the decline in exports leads to dramatic output losses in forestry and wood processing.
Forestry suffers more than wood processing, because there is almost no domestic
demand for the sector's output - except from the forward linkage to wood processing -,
which could substitute for the foregone exports. The high share of exported timber thus26
makes the ban rather effective as concerns forestry activity. The use of forest land in
forestry is more than halved,
2
9 while the rotation period and the harvested volume per
hectare per rotation remain constant. The effectiveness of the ban in slowing down the
activity in the timber industry imposes considerable costs on the Cameroonian
economy, as is indicated by a decline in real GDP of more than one percent.
The net effect of the ban on the use of tropical forest resources depends on how
agricultural conversion changes. This change can be explained by two dominating
economy-wide repercussions. First; the income losses in the economy lead to a
decreasing demand for domestically produced goods. This effect is particularly relevant
for the food-crops sector, which nearly exclusively serves the domestic market, while it
does not affect cash crops. Second, the drop in exports causes a real depreciation, which
favors cash crops and hurts food crops.
On balance, there is a reallocation of forest land from forestry and food crops to cash
crops, i.e. agricultural conversion increases compared to the reference situation.
However, the primary effect on land use in forestry dominates so that the volume of
standing timber increases by one million m
3. This outcome shows that a high share of
exported timber is the crucial precondition for an import ban to be ecologically
effective. Hence, the result should be interpreted as country-specific, as there are a
number of tropical countries - e.g. Brazil - with much lower export orientation of the
forestry industry (Amelung, Diehl, 1992). For those countries, a ban may well be
economically and ecologically counterproductive.
With respect to compensation payments for the conservation of tropical forests, we
presuppose that tropical and non-tropical countries have negotiated an environmental
agreement. Then, three basic questions arise for the individual tropical country: how^
can it reach the specified ecological goal; how much side payments will it receive for
the protection of its forests; and how is it going to spend the money. Consequently, one
has to analyze a combination of an external transfer and a complementary national
resource policy measure.
In simulation 11, it is assumed that the Cameroonian government directly sets aside
tropical forest areas and that the amount of compensation payments injected into the
economy - 65 million US Dollar (which was the result of simulation 3) - just matches
the economic losses resulting from the establishment of a national park.
3
0 Since the
theoretical reference point for transfer payments is given by the difference between
economic losses and local ecological gains of forest conservation, this amount
2
9 In this simulation, we assume that the supply of forest land is perfectly elastic in order to analyze the
impact of a ban on total land use.
™ We neglect here the principal-agent problem which may arise, i.e. the possibility that Cameroon
does not fulfill its ecological obligations after having received the transfer. Amelung (1991) suggests
that a payment in instalments can reduce this problem.27
constitutes an upper bound. Furthermore, the transfer is assumed to be provided under




The effects of establishing a national park have already been discussed in Section
4.1. Simulation 9 shows, how the external transfer qualifies these results. As the money
is invested and thus adds to the productive capacity of the economy, the increase in
demand exerts only moderate pressure on domestic prices. Nevertheless, the resulting
small appreciation and the higher income are sufficient to induce a reallocation of forest
land from cash crops and forestry to food crops so that the volume of standing timber
declines because of higher agricultural conversion. Hence, the effects of the
compensation payment somewhat dampen the effectiveness of the set-aside, but a
substantial ecological gain of 4.3 million m
3 biomass at zero economic costs remains
(see simulation 11).
If the same amount of money is used for consumption instead of investment
(simulation 10), a different picture emerges. The increase in demand forces up domestic
goods prices in relation to foreign goods prices as is indicated by a significant increase
in the real exchange rate. The price increase causes a decline in real investment so that
economic growth is lowered compared to the base run. This result shows that an
unconditional provision of transfers is not appropriate to compensate for the losses of
environmental protection.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has provided a numerical general equilibrium assessment of policies to
reduce tropical deforestation in Cameroon. While it was not feasible to examine every
possible method of deforestation control, we did analyze a variety of alternatives which
broadly reflect the continuum of national and international policies currently suggested
in the environmental and resource economics literature. Generally, the ecological
effects of deforestation control are shown to depend crucially upon its impact on forest
land use patterns whereas the efficiency effects hinge on the manner in which a
specified set-aside target is achieved.
More specifically, the following major results emerge from the simulation analysis:
The ecological target can be realized by each of the resource policies analyzed:
prolongation of forest leases; raising the minimum size of trees that can be harvested;
establishment of a national park; Pigou-tax on forest land.
Alternatively, one may formulate more specific conditions, e.g. that the transfers have to be used to
finance measures which enhance agricultural productivity outside the tropical forest.28
Since the main problem in Cameroon is the short rotation period and the damage caused
by frequent harvests, the best solution from an ecological point of view is to extend
logging concessions. This measure has also the lowest negative side effects on timber
production and exports as well as real GDP.
The trade-off between efficiency and ecological objectives can be overcome by a
general trade liberalization. However, such a policy leads to a further shortening of the
rotation period, thereby reducing its ecological effectiveness.
A preferable option would be to combine an across-the-board liberalization with long-
term logging concessions. Such a policy mix would, on the one hand, encourage a
sustainable use of tropical forests and, on the other hand, promote exports and economic
growth, thereby improving the long-run development potential of Cameroon without
any outside support.
An import ban for Cameroonian tropical wood, while being ecologically effective,
would place unacceptably high costs on the domestic economy. This result is country-
specific, as there are a number of tropical countries - e.g. Brazil - with much lower
export orientation of the forestry industry. For these countries, an import ban would be
economically and ecologically counterproductive.
If the international community wants to ensure a higher level of protection of tropical
rain forests, and to do so in a market-based system, the provision of additional financial
resources is necessary to support domestic resource policies. However, an unconditional
provision of transfers is inappropriate to compensate for the economic losses of
environmental protection. An ecologically effective and efficient policy mix has to
combine domestic resource policies with conditional outside payments used for capacity
enhancing investment.29
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